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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") represented the
Congressional response to the financial disaster that was
created by the collapse of Enron in 2001. Included in the
Act were attempts to strengthen accounting, auditing, and
financial controls to enhance the accuracy and disclosures
required under the securities laws in order to better protect
the investing public. Among the provisions of SOX are the
whistleblower protections for those providing evidence of
fraud or who participate in proceedings relating to
violations of the antifraud statutes or SEC rules. The focus
of this article is the administrative decisions and federal
cases involving the identification of the companies subject
to the whistleblower protection provision. The Act
provides that entities registered under Section 12 or
required to file under Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are covered. The issues in these
cases center on whether privately held subsidiaries of these
entities are also within its scope as well as the meaning of
the phrase, "officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor,
or agent of a company. " Depending on how these issues
are decided, the scope of SOX could be greatly expanded
beyond that originally contemplated by its drafters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") represented the
Congressional response to the financial disaster embodied in the collapse of
Enron Corporation in late 2001. Enacted on July 30, 2002, as Public Law
107-204, the Act contained numerous far reaching provisions to address the
accounting, auditing, and financial wrongdoings uncovered in subsequent
investigations of Enron's demise.' Its stated purpose is "[t]o protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
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made pursuant to the securities laws," among others.2 The Act is composed
of eleven titles concerning, for example, creation of a Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board,3  procedures for enhancing auditor
independence,4 rules for heightened corporate responsibility to the public,5
requirements to increase financial disclosures, 6 and several provisions for
new or greater criminal penalties relating to white collar crimes and
corporate fraud.7
The title of most relevance to this article is Title VIII, entitled the
"Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002."8 The primary
purpose of this Act was to create and enhance criminal penalties for those
defrauding publicly traded securities investors, those destroying evidence,
and to protect certain whistleblowers of publicly traded companies. 9
The whistleblower provision, section 806 of SOX, provides federal
protection to employees of publicly traded companies who provide
evidence of fraud to federal governmental authorities or their supervisor or
who participate in a proceeding relating to a violation of antifraud laws or
Securities and Exchange Commission rules.10
The whistleblower provision has already generated a flurry of legal
commentary.' This article, however, focuses on the administrative
decisions and federal cases that center around the issue of which companies
are subject to this provision. The statute seems to indicate that only those
2 Id. at Preamble.
3 Id. at §§ 101-109.
4 Id. at §§ 201-209.
5 Id at §§ 301-308.
6 Id. at §§ 401-409.
7 SOX at §§ 902-906 and 1102-1107.
8 Introduced on March 12, 2002, as S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002), by Senator Patrick
Leahy with co-sponsors Senator Thomas Daschle, Senator Richard Durbin, and Senator
Thomas Harkin. The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act later became
part of the larger enactment known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
9 S. REP. No. 107-146, at 1 (2002).
1018 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
11 See, e.g., Ira Rosenstein & Renee Phillips, Whistleblower Claims Under Sarbanes-
Oxley: Which Employers Are Covered? NYSBA INSIDE, Spring/Summer 2006, at 5;
Condon McGlothlen, The Scope of Whistleblower Protections Under Sarbanes-Oxley:
Are Privately Held Companies Covered? - Part II, THE METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Dec.
2005, at 36; Condon McGlothlen, The Scope of Whistleblower Protections Under
Sarbanes-Oxley: Are Privately Held Companies Covered? - Part , THE METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, Nov. 2005, at 32; Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing
Corporate Liability Exposure When the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era,
30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 445 (2005); Stanley L. Goodman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower
Protection - Two Years Later - What Hath Enron Wrought?, THE METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, Feb. 2005, at 23; G. Roger King, New Concern To Publicly Held Companies:
Protection of Whistleblowers Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, THE METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, Jan. 2003, Northeast Edition, at 19. In addition, the whistleblower provision
of Sarbanes-Oxley has been the subject of numerous state employment law newsletters
and law firm newsletters and client advisories.
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entities registered under section 12 or required to file under section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or their representatives, are covered.
2
As will be seen in the course of the article, however, controversy has arisen
over whether or not privately held subsidiaries of such companies are also
covered and over what is meant by the phrase "officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a company."'13 Depending on the
interpretations employed, the extent of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
protection may vastly exceed the number of companies typically considered
as being publicly traded.
The article begins with an examination of the relevant United States
Code and Federal Regulation sections and then proceeds to a chronological
look at many of the administrative law decisions and the few federal cases
on point. 14  A discussion and analysis of the cases follows. A brief
conclusion ends the article.
II. THE CODE AND REGULATIONS
What became Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 started
out as section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act
of 2002 ("CCFAA"), introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy on March 12,
2002.'" CCFAA, designated S. 2010, was proposed as part of the
Congressional reaction to the implosion of Enron Corporation in late 2001
and the attendant loss of jobs and millions of dollars in shareholder value.
Given the shock waves set off by Enron's collapse, it is not surprising that
Congress deemed extensive and rapid federal action necessary.16
One of the aspects of the Enron debacle that alarmed Congress was
the treatment of employees within Enron and its outside public accounting
firm, Arthur Andersen, who tried to bring wrongdoing to light. The most
well known of the so-called "whistleblowers" was Enron employee Sherron
Watkins. In August 2001, Watkins sought to bring accounting
malfeasances to the attention of top Enron management, including the
Chairman, Kenneth Lay. 17 Watkins' revelations were not heeded and the
company spiraled into bankruptcy by December 2001 amidst an SEC
12 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 11 2002).
13 Members of this group are identified as company representatives in the regulations.
29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2006) (defining "company representative"). See infra Case Law
and Discussion and Analysis sections.
14 The decisions of administrative law judges and the Administrative Review Board
were taken from the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
website, http://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited April 17, 2007). Page references in this
article are as they appear on the website's display of the cases.
15 S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002).
16 S. REP. No. 107-146, at 2-8 (2002).
17 Id. at 4.
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investigation and some devastating accounting restatements. Enron's stock
price dropped from a high of almost $90 per share to under $1 .1'
What particularly incensed Senator Leahy and the co-sponsors of S.
2010 was that rather than taking steps to investigate Watkins' claims and
remedy the accounting problems, the senior management of Enron
consulted legal counsel about the legality of terminating Watkins. Perhaps
even more distressing was legal counsel's opinion that under Texas law
Watkins could be fired with impunity. 19 It was the failure of some state
laws to protect whistleblowing employees in this situation that provided the
impetus for federal whistleblower protection for those reporting financial or
accounting improprieties. That protection was written into section 806 of
CCFAA, later to become Title VIII of SOX and codified at 18 U.S.C.
§1514A. Final regulations pursuant to this section are found at 29 C.F.R.
§1980.101 et seq.
Section 1514A provides federal whistleblower protection to
employees of any company with securities registered under section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any company that is required to file
reports under section 15(d) of that Act, or the company's representative.
Such companies are prohibited from discriminating against an employee
who provides information or files, or participates in a proceeding relating to
violations of securities laws or any federal law involving fraud against
shareholders .
8 Id. at 3.
'9 Id. at 5. The Senate Report quotes from an email sent by Enron's outside legal
counsel. It says, "'You asked that I include in this communication a summary of the
possible risks associated with discharging (or constructively discharging) employees
who report allegations of improper accounting practices: 1. Texas law does not
currently protect corporate whistleblowers. The supreme court has twice declined to
create a cause of action for whistleblowers who are discharged ... "' Id.
20 Section 1514A in its entirety reads:
Sec. 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud
cases
(a) Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly
Traded Companies.-No company with a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. § 781), or that is required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 780(d)),
or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee-
(1) to provide information, cause information to
be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation
regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344,
or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and
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Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information
or assistance is provided to or the investigation is
conducted by
(A) a Federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any
committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority
over the employee (or such other person working
for the employer who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in,
or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed
(with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an
alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any
rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders.
(b) Enforcement Action.
(1) In general.-A person who alleges discharge
or other discrimination by any person in violation of
subsection (a) may seek relief under subsection (c), by-
(A) filing a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor; or
(B) if the Secretary has not issued a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the
complaint and there is no showing that such delay
is due to the bad faith of the claimant, bringing an
action at law or equity for de novo review in the
appropriate district court of the United States,
which shall have jurisdiction over such an action
without regard to the amount in controversy.
(2) Procedure.
(A) In general.-An action under
paragraph (1)(A) shall be governed under the
rules and procedures set forth in section 42121(b)
of title 49, United States Code.
(B) Exception.-Notification made
under section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, shall be made to the person named in
the complaint and to the employer.
(C) Burdens of proof.-An action
brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed
by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
(D) Statute of limitations.-An action
under paragraph (1) shall be commenced not later
than 90 days after the date on which the violation
occurs.
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A person who believes that such discrimination has occurred may
file a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"), which conducts an investigation and makes a determination 2
Any party dissatisfied with the OSHA determination may request a de novo
review by an administrative law judge ("ALJF).22 Decisions by an ALJ are
subject to timely appeal to the Administrative Review Board ("ARB"),
which may or may not decide to hear the appeal.23 Decisions of the ARB
are considered final decisions of the Secretary of Labor and may be
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 4  If there is not a final
decision by the Secretary within 180 days of filing the complaint, the
claimant may initiate a lawsuit in District Court.25
A complainant must file a complaint within nintey days of the
alleged infraction. 6 The remedies available to a successful complainant are
those necessary to make them whole, including reinstatement, back pay
with interest, attorney fees, litigation costs, and expert witness fees.27
(c) Remedies.-
(1) In general. An employee prevailing in any
action under subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make the employee whole.
(2) Compensatory damages.-Relief for any
action under paragraph (1) shall include
(A) reinstatement with the same
seniority status that the employee would have
had, but for the discrimination;
(B) the amount of back pay, with
interest; and
(C) compensation for any special
damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert
witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
(d) Rights Retained by Employee. Nothing in this section
shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any
employee under any Federal or State law, or under any collective
bargaining agreement.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (complaint should be filed with the Secretary of Labor); 29
C.F.R. § 1980.103(c) (2006) (complaint should be filed with OSHA Area Director for
the geographical area in which the employee resides or was employed); 67 Fed. Reg.
65,008 (Oct. 22, 2002) (Secretary of Labor delegated responsibility of complaints to
OSHA).
2' 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.106(a), 1980.107(a), 1980.109(a) (2006).
23 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110 (2006).24 29 C.F.R. § 1980.112 (2006).
25 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 112002); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a) (2006).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 112002); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d) (2006).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (Supp. 11 2002).
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Other portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require that audit
committees of public companies establish procedures for receiving
complaints regarding accounting matters and for assuring employees of the
ability to report confidentially and anonymously concerns about accounting
or auditing issues.28 The Act also criminalizes retaliation against a
whistleblower by imposing a fine, imprisonment for up to ten years, or
both .29
III. THE CASE LAW
Despite its relative newness, the SOX whistleblower provision has
generated a significant number of decisions at the ALJ level and a handful
at the ARB and district court levels. This section provides a chronological
summary of the more noteworthy decisions relating to the issues of
parent/subsidiary liability and liability stemming from a contractor,
subcontractor, or agent.
A. Administrative Law Judge Decisions
1. Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc.
30
In the first ALJ decision involving a dispute over a covered
respondent under SOX, the ALJ dismissed a whistleblower complaint
against Pinnacle Airlines on the grounds that it was not a publicly traded
company. Pinnacle was a wholly owned subsidiary of NWA, Inc., which,
in turn, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Northwest Airlines Corporation.
Northwest Airlines was a publicly held company. Powers' claim against
Northwest was dismissed for two reasons. First, Powers was not an
employee of Northwest and Northwest had not been named as a respondent
in the time required by statute. Second, the ALJ held that Northwest could
not be held liable for the actions of Pinnacle, Powers' direct employer,
because there was no basis for piercing the corporate veil or otherwise
recognizing the actions of Pinnacle as being those of Northwest.
31
28 15 u.s.c. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).29 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006).
30 2003-AIR-00012 (Mar 5, 2003).
Id. at 4. Piercing the corporate veil is ajudicial device for ignoring the separateness
normally attendant between a corporation and its shareholders. The result is that the
shareholders become liable for the actions of the corporation, losing their limited
liability protection. In the context of a parent/subsidiary relationship a parent may
become liable for the actions of a subsidiary if the parent dominates the subsidiary such
that the subsidiary is a "mere instrumentality" of the parent. This determination is more
art than science. Courts have historically looked at the following factors:
(1) the presence in both corporations of the same officers or
directors; (2) common shareholders; (3) financial support of the
subsidiary's operations by the parent; (4) underwriting the
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2. Morefield v. Exelon Services, et al.32
Morefield is an ALJ decision frequently relied upon by those
seeking to impose liability on a privately owned subsidiary of a publicly
held parent. In this early 2004 decision, the ALJ denied a motion to dismiss
filed by respondents Exelon Services, Inc., and Exelon Corporation.
Exelon Services was a subsidiary of a subsidiary of Exelon Corporation,
which was publicly traded. Morefield was an employee of Exelon Services
who claimed he was terminated because of whistleblowing activities against
his employer. In this regard, the Morefield facts parallel those in Powers.
The judge based his decision favoring the complainant largely on
his view of the purposes and intent of Sarbanes-Oxley. Subsidiaries like
Exelon Services, he reasoned, are an integral part of their publicly traded
parents, and the value and performance of the parent are derivatives of the
values and performances of all those entities that comprise it.33 Therefore,
SOX whistleblower protection extended to all the components of a publicly
traded parent, including privately held subsidiaries. The Powers decision
was distinguished on the grounds that there the publicly traded parent had
not been properly named as a respondent.34 Importantly, the ALJ said he
disagreed with Powers to the extent that it implied that veil-piercing facts
must be present to afford protection to an employee of a privately held
subsidiary.35
Morefield remains the broadest reading of the coverage of SOX's
whistleblower protections. As will be discussed subsequently, that reading
of SOX has been called into question by other decisions.
incorporation and purchase of all of the capital stock of the
subsidiary by the parent corporation; (5) the fact that the subsidiary
was organized with a grossly inadequate capital structure; (6) ajoint
accounting and payroll system; (7) the subsidiary lacks substantial
business contact with any save the parent and operates solely with
assets conveyed by the parent corporation; (8) in the financial
statements of the parent, the subsidiary is referred to as a division of
the parent corporation or obligations are assumed to be those of the
parent; (9) the property of the subsidiary is used by the parent
corporation as its own; (10) the individuals who exercise operating
control over the subsidiary exercise it in the interest of the parent;
and (11) failure to observe the formal requirements attributable to the
operation of a subsidiary.
R. A. Horton, Annotation, Liability of Corporation for Torts of Subsidiary, 7 A.L.R. 3d
1343, § 4[a] (1966).
32 2004-SOX-0002 (Jan 28, 2004).
33 Id. at 4-5.
34 Id. at 7.
35 id.
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3. Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airline Holdings, Inc. 36
In another decision by the same ALJ that decided Powers, an effort
to avoid SOX whistleblower liability as an allegedly non-covered employer
failed. Although the complainant was an employee of a privately held
subsidiary of a publicly traded holding company, the holding company was
deemed responsible for its subsidiary's actions because the subsidiary was a
"mere instrumentality" of the parent.37 In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ
cited as the basis for her holding the commonality of senior management,
the interchangeable use of the parent and subsidiary names, the providing of
subsidiary employee benefits by the parent, and a general failure to keep the
corporate identities separate in appearances to the SEC, the public, and
employees. Obviously, this was a case where veil piercing was used to
find liability.
4. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Technologies Holdings, Inc.39
Klopfenstein is a peculiar case in that the complainant filed a SOX
complaint against neither his privately held direct employer nor the publicly
traded parent of his employer's parent. Rather, Klopfenstein filed only
against his employer's parent (a subsidiary of the publicly traded entity).
No explanation for this was offered in the decision.
The ALJ agreed with the complainant and the decision in Morefield
that an employee of a private subsidiary of a public company would be
within the purview of SOX's whistleblower provisions. 40 The judge even
indicated that the likelihood was that Klopfenstein would have been entitled
to SOX protection had he named the publicly traded parent as a respondent
because of the commonality of management and purpose between parent
and subsidiary.4 ' Unfortunately for Klopfenstein, however, he had not.
Further, the decision rejects Klopfenstein's arguments that a
subsidiary of a public company could be sued without the parent and that
the subsidiary could be sued alone as an agent of the publicly traded parent.
In key language, the decision states that "if a publicly traded corporation for
purposes of this Act is the 'sum of its constituent units' [then the
intermediate subsidiary and respondent] was not an 'agent' as referenced in
the Act.",42 That language would seem to imply that a subsidiary cannot
also be an agent of the parent for purposes of SOX whistleblower liability.
16 2003-SOX-00027 (Apr 30, 2004).
37 Id. at21.
31 Id. at 20.
39 2004-SOX-0001 1 (July 6, 2004), remanded to ARB No. 04-149 (May 31, 2006).4 0 2004-SOX-00011 at 11.
41 id.
42 Id. at 12 (quoting Morefield, 2004-SOX-00002 at 6).
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In essence, then, the ALI decision in Klopfenstein supports the
holding of Morefield but results in a different outcome because of the
complainant's failure to name the publicly traded parent as a respondent.
As discussed below, the ARB remanded this decision two years later.43
5. Gonzalez v. Colonial Bank, et. a1
44
Once again an ALJ was faced with a decision as to whether or not
an employee of a privately held subsidiary of a publicly traded parent was
entitled to SOX whistleblower protection. Here, unlike Klopfenstein, both
the direct employer and the parent were named respondents.
After a brief review of Morefield, Klopfenstein, and Powers, the
ALJ concluded that "[a]s the parent company is a respondent in this case
and it is determined that Congress intended to provide whistleblower
protection to employees of subsidiaries of publicly traded companies,
complainant has set forth a cause of action under the Act sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary decision. 45 Two items are noteworthy
here. First, the ALJ was merely deciding a motion for summary decision,
not a final adjudication on the merits. Second, while supportive of
Morefield, the complainant alleged that the parent and subsidiary were joint
actors in Gonzalez's termination, a different and more compelling situation
than Morefield.
6. Hughart v. Raymond James & Assoc., Inc. 46
Hughart does not substantially change the landscape of SOX
whistleblower claims but it does add a refinement to the flavor of Platone
and Klopfenstein. Like Platone and Klopfenstein, Hughart focused on the
issue of parent/subsidiary commonality or entwinement. The refinement
offered by Hughart, however, is that the parent involvement with the
subsidiary must be with regard to "the work environment of, or termination
decision about, an employee of its subsidiary company. 47
In the instant case, while finding some commonality with respect to
employer benefits, the ALJ determined that sufficient independence existed
between the parent and subsidiary with respect to payroll, funds,
supervision, and employee contact so that the subsidiary was not subject to
the SOX whistleblower provisions.48
43 See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
44 2004-SOX-00039 (Aug 20, 2004).
41 d. at 4.
46 2004-SOX-00009 (Dec 17, 2004).
47 Id. at44.
41 Id. at 45.
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7. Roulett v. American Capital Access
49
While not a major case in the area, Roulett is noted for its attempt
to argue that a respondent is subject to SOX as a "company representative"
of a publicly traded company by virtue of the respondent's purchase and
sale of products and services with such a company. 50 The complainant had
argued that such interaction made the respondent a "contractor,
subcontractor, or agent" of the public company and hence governed by
SOX.51  The ALJ wisely and summarily declined to extend the
whistleblower protections so far.52
Roulett may also be noteworthy for its holding that a respondent is
not a covered employer where it has withdrawn its registration statement
under section 12 prior to approval of the statement by the SEC or an
exchange.53 Because of this holding, the complainant made the argument
discussed in the previous paragraph.
8. Mann v. United Space Alliance LLC
54
Of interest in Mann is the issue of whether SOX protection extends
to an employee of a privately held limited liability company which was
owned equally by two publicly held companies, Boeing and Lockheed
Martin.
Relying on Morefield, Platone, Klopfenstein, and Gonzalez, the
ALJ granted a summary decision to Boeing and Lockheed based on their
lack of commonality and control over United Space Alliance (USA).55 The
ALJ determined that USA was distinct from its owners and was not subject
to their internal controls (citing Gonzalez), nor was it an "inseparable,
integral part" of either entity (citing Morefield).56 The reference to
Morefield's language is curious, as an objective reading of the decision
would not conclude that being an "inseparable, integral part" of another
entity is a requirement for SOX protection. The ALJ in Morefield simply
stated that subsidiaries were, in fact, inseparable and integral parts of their
parent. USA was likewise granted summary judgment as it was not
publicly traded nor was it acting as an agent of a publicly traded entity
when it allegedly engaged in the prohibited conduct.
57
49 2004-SOX-00078 (Dec. 22, 2004).
50 Id. at 8-9. A "company representative" is defined in the regulations as "any officer,
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a publicly traded company." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1980.101 (2006).5 2004-SOX-00078 (Dec. 22, 2004) at 8.
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 8.
54 2004-SOX-00015 (Feb 18, 2005).
55 Id. at 9.
56 id.
57
id.
426 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
9. Minkina v. Affiliated Physicians Group 58
The Complainant in this case sought to argue that her private
employer was subject to SOX as an "officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent" of a publicly traded company. 59 The ALJ however,
granted summary decision to Affiliated Physicians finding that the Act
implicitly required the officer, etc., to be engaged in the prohibited conduct
"on behalf of' an otherwise covered employee.60  No such facts were
present here nor was Affiliated Physicians a subsidiary of a publicly traded
entity. The ALJ held that "there is nothing in the language of [SOX] or its
legislative history that suggests Congress intended to bring the employees
of non-public contractors, subcontractors, and agents under the protective
aegis of section 806.
"
,
6 1
10. Grant v. Dominion East Ohio Gas 62
Here the Complainant only named a privately held subsidiary,
Dominion East Ohio Gas, as respondent. Complainant did not introduce
evidence that its parent, though not named, was publicly traded. 63 In dicta,
the AU stated that even had the parent been named, and even if the parent
were publicly traded, the complainant would need to establish either that
the circumstances warranted piercing the corporate veil or that the
64
subsidiary was acting as the agent of the parent. The ALJ cited to
Platone, Morefield (again wrongly believing that it requires that a
subsidiary be an integral and inseparable part of the parent), Klopfenstein,
Gonzalez, and (curiously and without explanation) Powers.65
11. Dawkins v. Shell Chemical, Inc.
6 6
Complainant here again failed to name a publicly traded parent as a
respondent. The ALJ noted that while an employer of a non-publicly traded
subsidiary could be covered by SOX (citing Morefield), there must be
grounds for piercing the corporate veil to do so (citing Powers and
Klopfenstein).6' No basis for doing so existed in this case and the complaint
was dismissed.
58 2005-SOX-00019 (Feb 22, 2005).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 11 2002). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
60 2005-SOX-00019 at 6. (emphasis added).
61 id.
6' 2004-SOX-00063 (Mar 10, 2005).
6,Id. at 33.64 Id. at 34.65 Id. at 34-35.
6' 2005-SOX-00041 (May 16, 2005).67 Id. at4.
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12. Kalkunte v. DVI Financial Services, Inc. & AP Services, LLC68
This case represented something of a twist on the typical SOX
whistleblower protection fact pattern, but it nonetheless contains some
interesting observations.
The complaining employee in this case was an employee of DVI, a
publicly traded company which was going through bankruptcy and
dissolution. AP Services, a non-publicly traded limited liability company,
contracted with DVI to provide DVI with management services during this
process. Pursuant to that contract, employees of AP were placed in
management positions with DVI, and one of the AP employees terminated
complainant. 69 Complainant sought SOX whistleblower protection against
both entities (DVI and AP), likely targeting AP due to the financial
destitution of DVI. AP argued, unsuccessfully, that it was not a SOX
covered employer.
The crux of the case hinged on the SOX language that indicates that
prohibited retaliation extends not only to companies registered under
section 12 or filing under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 but to "any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of
such company."70  AP argued that the quoted language meant that these
entities could only create vicarious liabilityfor a publicly traded company.!
The ALJ rejected that interpretation. Rather, the judge determined that AP
was an agent of DVI and thus acquired attendant respondeat superior
liability to DVI's employee.7 2 Here again it is important to remember that
the primary target of the complainant was probably AP Services, not DVI,
the publicly traded company that was the complainant's actual employer.
In the course of his opinion the ALI stated that he found Morefield
"persuasive ' 73 and said that the text of SOX clearly made it applicable to
other than companies with registered securities. 74 To support his extension
of liability to AP on these facts the ALI said AP's argument was
inconsistent with the language, legislative history, regulations, and case law
of SOX but did not elaborate on the assertion.75 This is in some contrast to
the language of Minkina, discussed earlier and reiterated in Stevenson v.
Neighborhood House Charter School,76 that "there is nothing in the
language of [SOX] or its legislative history that suggests that Congress
" 2004-SOX-00056 (July 18, 2005).69 1d. at 3-5.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. II 2002).
71 2004-SOX-00056 at 6, 8.
72 Id. at 6.
73 id.74 Id. at 8-9.
75 Id. at 8.
76 2005-SOX-00087 (Sep 7, 2005).
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intended to bring the employers of non-public contractors, subcontractors
and agents under the protective aegis of section 806." 77
13. Bothwell v. American Income Life78
Once again, at issue in this case, inter alia, was whether a non-
publicly traded subsidiary of a publicly traded parent was subject to the
SOX whistleblower provisions. As in other cases, the parent was not
named as a respondent in a timely and proper manner. It was undisputed
that American Income Life ("AIL") was not a publicly traded company and
that it was not an "officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent" of
one. 79 The Complainant sought to make AIL a covered employer strictly
based on its status as a subsidiary of a covered employer.
In granting a summary decision dismissing the complaint the ALJ
pointed to what he called the "clear statutory language" and legislative
history of SOX.80 He asserted that Congress could have clearly included
subsidiaries such as AlL had it wished to do so but did not.81 He quoted
Senator Sarbanes to the effect that the intent of the drafters was to only
target registered companies, not "companies who make up the vast majority
of companies across the country. 82 To agree with Complainant's view
would, the ALJ said, expand the reach of SOX well beyond that intended by
Congress. 3
The decision also noted that even had the publicly traded parent
been properly named as a respondent, SOX protections would not have
extended to AIL because there was insufficient indication that the parent
dominated AIL with respect to employment matters sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil.
8 4
14. Brady v. Direct Mail Management, Inc. 85
This case reiterated the view that for a non-publicly traded
company to be subject to SOX it must be found to have been acting on
behalf of an otherwise covered employer or be under the dominion of such
an employer with respect to matters of employment.86 Such was not the
case here and respondent's request for summary decision was granted.
77 2005-SOX-00019 at 6.
78 2005-SOX-00057 (Sep 19, 2005).
79 Id. at6.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. Senator Sarbanes' statement may be found at 148 CONG. REC. S7351 (daily ed.
July 25, 2002).
83 2005-SOX-00057 at 6.
14 Id. at 8-9.
15 2006-SOX-00016 (Jan 5, 2006).86 1d. at8.
2007] DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE 429
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF SOX
15. Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp. 87
Complainant sought to bring his privately held employer within
SOX whistleblower coverage on the grounds that it was a "contractor,
subcontractor, or agent" of covered employers. 88 After acknowledging
more liberal interpretations of SOX coverage (citing Gonzalez, Morefield,
and Klopfenstein) and the "remedial nature" of SOX, the ALJ nevertheless
determined that SOX only applied to employees of publicly traded
companies and not those of their privately held contractors or
subcontractors. 9 The decision draws a clear and unqualified line on the
extension of SOX whistleblower liability.
16. Reno v. Westfield Corp., Inc.90
Citing Goodman and Minkina, the ALJ in this case found a
privately held employer not within the scope of SOX whistleblower
coverage despite being an alleged contractor of a covered employer. 91 It
was necessary, said the ALJ, that the contractor be acting on behalf of the
covered employer when engaging in the prohibited conduct.92 Such facts
were not present in the case.
17. Gale v. World Financial Group
93
Complainant in this case sought to bring an eight-level-removed
subsidiary of a covered entity within the reach of SOX by alleging it was a
"company representative" of the covered entity. In the regulations adopted
pursuant to the whistleblower provisions of SOX, "company representative"
is the umbrella term used to refer to officers, employees, contractors,
subcontractors or agents of a publicly traded company.9 4  While
acknowledging that the mere existence of a parent/subsidiary relationship
was not enough to trigger protection, the AU denied the respondent's
motion for summary decision to allow the complainant the opportunity to
show that respondent was a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of its
publicly traded, far removed parent.9'
2006-SOX-00011 (Jan 10, 2006).
88Id. at 8-9.
89 1d. at 9-10.
90 2006-SOX-00030 (Feb 23, 2006).9'Id. at 4.
92Id at 3, 4.
93 2006-SOX-00043 (June 9, 2006).
94 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2006).
9' 2006-SOX-00043 at 9, 10. This may conflict with some language in the ALJ
decision in Klopfenstein which seems to imply that a company cannot be both a
subsidiary and an agent. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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18. Johnson v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank 
96
Complainant in this case survived a motion to dismiss his SOX
whistleblower claim against a private subsidiary of a publicly traded parent.
The notable aspect of the case is the AL's assertion that the issue of
subsidiary liability under these circumstances was too unsettled after almost
four years of litigation to grant the motion. Bothwell and Powers were
cited as rendering restrictive views of SOX coverage and Mann and
Morefield as representing more expansive ones.9
8
19. Deutschmann v. Fortis Investments 99
The lone respondent in this case, Fortis Investments, was a non-
covered subsidiary of a Belgian financial services firm. The complainant
had asserted that Fortis was subject to SOX either as a company
representative or as a subsidiary of a publicly traded entity or that the parent
should be liable through veil piercing.1°° The parent was not named as a
respondent. The more significant problem, however, was that the parent
was not itself a covered employer under the SOX whistleblower
provisions.101  Therefore, summary decision in favor of Fortis was
appropriate and granted.
B. Administrative Review Board Decisions
1. Flake v. New World Pasta Co. 102
This early ARB decision is likely notable solely because it was the
first ARB decision addressing the issue of SOX whistleblower coverage.
The complainant had named a non-public subsidiary as the sole respondent.
The Board dismissed the case as neither the subsidiary nor its parent were a
publicly traded company.
96 2006-SOX-00019 (June 9, 2006).
97 1d. at4.
9 Id. at 3-4.
99 2006-SOX-00080 (June 14, 2006).
00 Id. at2.
101 Id. at 3. The parent firm did not have securities registered under section 12, nor was
it required to file under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as is
required by SOX. The ALJ also noted the First Circuit decision in Carnero v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), which held that SOX whistleblower
liability did not extend to companies headquartered outside the United States.
102 ARB No. 03-126 (Feb 25, 2004).
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2. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Technologies Holdings, Inc., et. al. 103
On the issue of whether a non-public subsidiary of a publicly traded
company is subject to SOX whistleblower coverage, the ARB avoided a
decision. Flake v. New World Pasta Co. was distinguished as it did not
involve a publicly traded parent. Instead, the Board focused on the
potential agency relationship between the parent and the respondent
subsidiary.10 4 It held that it was not necessary under SOX to sue a covered
employer if a respondent was a company representative (officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent) of a covered employer. 05  That
question, said the Board, must be resolved by reference to principles of
agency law. 106 On remand, that issue needed to be decided by the ALI,
although the Board volunteered that given the common officers between
parent and subsidiary and the involvement of the parent in the subsidiary's
investigation of complainant, agency likely existed. 0 7
C. U. S. District Court Decision
In Brady v. Calyon Securities,108 plaintiff had brought several
claims including a SOX whistleblower claim against several defendants,
none of which was registered nor filed under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as required by SOX. Rather, plaintiff argued that they were covered
defendants because they were "agents" of publicly traded companies. 1° 9
The District Court rejected the argument.
The Court held that the language in SOX referencing an agent of a
publicly traded company meant that the entity acting as agent must be under
the direction of a publicly traded company with respect to matters of
employment.1 10  Plaintiffs theory would extend SOX protection
impermissibly. In the Court's words, "Nothing in the Act suggests that it is
intended to provide general whistleblower protection to the employees of
any employer whose business involves acting in the interests of public
companies. '1
103 ARB No. 04-149 (May 31, 2006).
104 Id. at 13.
105 id.
106 Id. at 14.
107 Id. at 15.
108 Brady v. Calyon Securities, 406 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y 2005).
109 Id. at 318.
110 Id.
11Id
432 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Publicly traded companies identified in SOX are understandably
concerned about the extent of their liability under the whistleblower
provisions. Particularly in some of the early ALJ decisions discussed
earlier, there was reason to believe that the class of protected employees
may be much larger than perhaps first envisioned." 2  Some of the more
recent decisions, however, seem to have retreated from an expanded reading
of who is considered a covered employer.' ' 3 At issue is whether section 12
registrants and section 15(d) filers under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are also liable for the actions of their privately held subsidiaries or
their privately held, "contractors, subcontractors, or agents."
As indicated in the case discussion of Morefield, that decision
contains the most expansive reading of SOX whistleblower coverage. 1 4 It
seems to take the view that all subsidiary actions are attributable to the
parent simply because they are a constituent part of the parent." 5 The ALJ
in that case viewed his reading as consistent with the purpose and intent of
SOX.116 Additionally, the Morefield decision states that facts sufficient to
pierce the corporate veil are not necessary to trigger parent liability.''
Morefield does not discuss the issue of liability through contractors,
subcontractors, or agents.
Morefield is an overextension of SOX coverage and the ARB
would be wise to take the opportunity to say so as soon as an appropriate
case comes onto its docket. There is no indication in the language of the
statute, regulations, or legislative history that suggests that Congress
intended to abrogate the traditional common law rules of parent/subsidiary
liability. While Congress was certainly desirous of mitigating the "vagaries
and patchwork 118 of state whistleblower protection laws, even the title of
§1514A(a) of the United States Code, which was added by SOX, is
designated, "Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded
Companies."119 Comments of Senators Sarbanes and Leahy repeat this
112 See, e.g., Morefield v. Exelon Services, Inc., 2004-SOX-00002 (January 28, 2004);
Gonzalez v. Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-00039 (August 20, 2004); Kalkunte v. DVI
Financial Services, Inc., 2004-SOX-00041 (May 16, 2005).
113 See, e.g., Bothwell v. American Income Life, 2005-SOX-00057 (September 19,
2005); Goodman v. Decisive Analytics, Corp., 2006-SOX-00011 (January 10, 2006);
Reno v. Westfield corp., Inc., 2006-SOX-00030 (February 23, 2006).
114 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
115 Morefield, 2004-SOX-00002 (January 28, 2004) at 5-6, 8.
116Id. at 5-6.
117 Id. at 7.
1 See S. REP. No.107-146 at 13 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7421 (daily ed. July 26,
2002).
''9 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 112002). (emphasis added).
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language. 12  The Code of Federal Regulations defines a "company" under
the Act as one filing under sections 12 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.121 Several of the ALJ decisions discussed above affirm this
view. 122
On the other hand, one should assume that traditional common law
views of veil piercing will be utilized in SOX whistleblower cases.123 Thus,
if a parent company disrespects the separateness and independence of its
subsidiaries and treats the subsidiary as a mere agent or instrumentality, it
should expect that courts and AU's applying SOX protections will likewise
disregard the separateness of the entities and attribute the actions of the
subsidiary to a publicly traded parent.
124
120 148 CONG. REC. S7351 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); 148
CONG. REC. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
121 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2006).
122See, e.g., Bothwell v. American Income Life, 2005-SOX-00057 at 6 (Sept. 19, 2005)
("To include non-publicly traded subsidiary as a 'company' merely because it has a
publicly traded parent, would widen the scope of the Act beyond the intentions of
Congress."); Andrews and Barron v. ING North American Insurance Corporation,
2005-SOX-00050 (Feb 17, 2006) at 5 ("[N]either the statutory language of the Act nor
its legislative history suggests Congress intended to include alone a non-publicly traded
subsidiary of a publicly traded parent company as a covered employer.").
123 The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the liability of a
parent corporation for the actions of a subsidiary in U. S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
(1998). At issue in that case was a parent's liability for its subsidiary under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). In the course of the opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter stated,
"CERCLA is thus like many other congressional enactments in giving no indication
'that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a
plaintiffs cause of action is based on a federal statute."' (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 478 (1979)). Justice Souter also favorably quoted from U.S. v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529, 534 (1993), that "in order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law." Bestfoods, 524
U.S. at 63. The same principles are true under Sarbanes-Oxley as to the general
common law respect for the separateness of parent and subsidiary corporations and the
common law rules with respect to piercing the corporate veil.
124 U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62-63 (1998) (quoting Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v.
Minneapolis Civic and Commerce Assn., 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918)); Powers v.
Pinnacle Airlines, 2003-AIR-00012 (Mar. 5, 2003); Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airline
Holdings, Inc., 2003-SOX-00027 (Apr. 30, 2004); Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow
Technologies Holdings, Inc., 2004-SOX-0001 1 (Jul. 6, 2004); Hughart v. Raymond
James & Assoc., 2004-SOX-00009 (Dec. 17, 2004); Grant v. Dominion Ohio Gas,
2004-SOX-00063 (Mar. 10, 2005); Dawkins v. Shell Chemical, Inc., 2005-SOX-00041
(May 16, 2005); Bothwell v. American Income Life, 2005-SOX-00057 (Sept. 19,
2005); Deutschmann v. Fortis Investments, 2006-SOX-00080 (Jun. 14, 2006). Three
quarters of a century ago, then-professor William 0. Douglas co-authored a seminal
work on parent/subsidiary liability issues. The advice given in that piece for
maintaining separate legal identities and avoiding liability attribution is still sound
today. Douglas and Shanks counseled as follows:
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Situations where it is alleged that a privately held entity is acting as
a contractor, subcontractor, or agent are potentially more problematic
because unlike subsidiaries the statute specifically refers to them. These
cases require a common sense reading of the legislation and consideration
of the legislative history. Given that Congress was generally targeting the
employees of publicly traded companies for protection, one meaning of the
phrase "or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
company" would be that a publicly traded company cannot utilize any of
the mentioned actors to accomplish the prohibited treatment. As stated in
Minkina,125 Goodman,126 and Reno,127 the language means that those
The observance of the following four standards will keep
the business units from being treated as assimilated: (1) A separate
financial unit should be set up and maintained. That unit should be
sufficiently financed so as to carry the normal strains upon it. The
risks attendant on the conduct of a business of that type can roughly
be averaged and that average met. (2) The day to day business of the
two units should be kept separate. Normally each process can be
tagged so as to identify it with the activity of one unit or with that of
the other. Occasionally such tagging will be difficult in a case where
the two businesses are merely units in a line of production. But such
separation as the technology of the business permits should be
sufficient. And in addition the financial and business records of the
two units should be separately kept. (3) The formal barriers between
the two management structures should be maintained. The ritual of
separate meetings should be religiously observed. The activities of
the individuals serving on the two boards can be tagged so that the
individuals qua directors of the subsidiary can always be
distinguished from the same individuals qua directors of the parent.
Such tagging is not pure fiction. It draws the line that keeps the dual
capacities separate and distinct. It conforms to the habit of thought
which accepts the fact of dual capacity but which demands a
separation of conduct so that each act may be clearly categorized.
Separate meetings of the boards are sufficient. The same problem
arises in connection with the officers. And the same solution
suggests itself; a man may not be indiscriminately one officer or
another. The observance of the niceties of business efficiency are
normally sufficient. Such demands are not exacting. They merely
suffice to keep the record of the business affairs of the two units
from becoming hopelessly intermingled. (4) The two units should
not be represented as being one unit. Those with whom they come in
contact should be kept sufficiently informed of their separate
identities.
Conformity with the above standards is all that normally could
be required of two units so closely connected.
William Douglas and Carrol Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929).
12' 2005-SOX-00019 (February 22, 2005) at 6. ("[T]his language simply lists the
various potential actors who are prohibited from engaging in discrimination on behalf
of a covered employer.").
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persons or entities can create liability for a section 12 or section 15(d)
reporting company when they engage in prohibited conduct on behalf of the
publicly traded company. The language should also mean that a privately
held employer can be liable for prohibited treatment of its employees who
have reported infractions with respect to a publicly traded company. For
example, an attorney in a law firm that represents a publicly traded
company who reports financial wrongdoing by the company and is
subsequently fired by the firm should be a protected employee with a valid
SOX claim against the law firm. Such an interpretation is evidenced in the
Whistleblower Investigations Manual of OSHA. After citing the language
of the statute the Manual says that ". . . an employee of an otherwise non-
covered employer (e.g., a small accounting firm) that is a contractor of a
covered company who provides information to the SEC regarding a
violation of SEC regulations . . . would be protected from subsequent
retaliation. ,1 28  This may be a broader scope of liability than OSHA
expressed in its responses to public comments on the proposed regulations
under section 806.129 It is unreasonable to assert, however, that the intent of
this language is to infer that any entity that contracts with a publicly traded
company is now subject to SOX whistleblower liability with regard to any
act of whistleblowing. 130  Such a reading would likely cover the vast
12 2006-SOX-0001 1 (January 10, 2006) at 10. ("... the terms 'contractor' and
Isubcontractor' in the provision reference two of various entities of a publicly traded
company that may not adversely affect the terms and conditions of an employee of a
publicly traded company.") (emphasis in original).
12 2006-SOX-30 (February 23, 2006) at 4. (".... I also interpret Section 1514A(a) to
hold contractors of publicly held companies liable only when they act on behalf of the
publicly traded company.").
128 OSHA WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, Chapter 14, Section 11I,
effective August 22, 2003, available at www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive pdfDiS 0-
0_9.pdf.
129 In response to public comments on the proposed regulations, OSHA stated, "The
statute thus protects the employees of publicly traded companies as well as the
employees of contractors, subcontractors, and agents ofthose publicly traded
companies." 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104, 52,106 (August 24, 2004). Later in its responses,
however, OSHA said that based on ARB decisions under other whistleblower statutes a
respondent will be liable for the actions of a contractor or subcontractor where the
respondent "acted as an employer with regard to the employee of the contractor or
subcontractor, whether by exercising control of the work product or by establishing,
modifying, or interfering with the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Id.
at 52,107. That is certainly a sensible view but it is an unduly narrow one if it means
that is the only scenario where liability may be imposed on a publicly traded respondent
with respect to its contractors, subcontractors, or agents. Presumably, it does not.
130 As was well stated by the ALJ in Roulett v. American Capital Access, 2004-SOX-
00078 (December 22, 2004) at 9, "The Act provides specific requirements for its
coverage, which I decline to expand to a non-publicly traded company solely because it
engages in financial business with publicly traded companies." See also Stevenson v.
Neighborhood House Charters School, 2005-SOX-00087 (September 7, 2005) at 6 (the
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majority of businesses in the country, an outcome not intended by the
drafters. 131
In this regard the Kalkunte132 case presents an interesting situation.
It will be recalled that in this case the complainant was seeking to impose
liability on a privately held company (AP Services) because of the
bankruptcy of the publicly traded one (DVI) that was the complainant's
actual employer. In this case, there was no parent/subsidiary relationship.
The complainant successfully argued that the privately held entity was
liable under SOX because it was an agent of the public company and thus
within the language of the statute. Thus, rather than a scenario where the
private company creates vicarious liability for the public company, here the
situation was reversed. Under principles of agency law, an agent that
commits a tort on behalf of a principal is generally liable along with the
principal. 3 3 So, in Kalkunte, if AP Services was in fact an agent of DVI
with respect to the employment and termination of the complainant, under
both the language of the statute and accepted views of agency law, AP is
liable. What is puzzling in the opinion is the AL's rejection of AP
Services' correct assertion that the "contractor, subcontractor, agent"
language of SOX meant that "publicly traded companies are vicariously
liable if their officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, or agents
violate the Act."' 13 4 AP's assertion is, in fact, likely what the drafters meant.
What is more, the ALJ could have acknowledged this reading of the
relevant language and still reached the same analysis and outcome with
respect to the somewhat unusual facts of the case. As it is, this decision as
written may create unnecessary concerns that AP Services' argument was
incorrect and the door will be opened to an interpretation that makes any
company doing business with a publicly traded company subject to SOX
liability. That is unfortunate and unwarranted.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a reaction to the scandalous
conduct of Enron Corporation and the resulting loss of jobs and millions of
dollars of shareholder value. Congress was rightly concerned about the
ALJ endorsed the language of Minkina that SOX's language and history argue against
inclusion of non-publicly traded contractors, subcontractors, or agents).
M As quoted previously, Senator Sarbanes himself said that the whistleblower
protections were only intended to apply to employees of publicly traded companies, not
those "who make up the vast majority of companies across the country." 148 CONG.
REC. S7351 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (quoted in Bothwell, 2005-SOX-00057 (Sep 19,
2005) at 6).
132 004-SOX-00056 (July 18, 2005).
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
14 2004-SOX-00056 at 8. Referring to AP Services' argument, the ALJ stated, "I find
this argument is inconsistent with the 'plain text' of SOX, the legislative intent behind
the statute, the regulations, and case law." Id.
20071 DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE 437
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF SOX
numerous abuses, obfuscation, and fraud that occurred there, costing many
people their jobs, savings, and retirement funds. One component of the
Enron failure was the unwillingness to listen to the voices of alarm from
within the company and, indeed, the desire on the part of some senior
managers to punish and thereby silence those voices. As they have in other
areas, Congress sought in Sarbanes-Oxley to provide federal protection to
whistleblowers so as to remove them from the uncertainties of the various
state laws. 135 But the protections Congress fashioned (reinstatement, back
pay, attorney fees, etc.) were limited in their application. They only applied
to employees of publicly traded companies (as Enron was) or those acting
on their behalf, and they only applied to whistleblowing with respect to
certain types of wrongdoing relating to accounting, auditing, securities or
shareholder fraud. As much as some would like to broaden that coverage to
protect many other whistleblowing employees, Congress did not see fit to
do so in this legislation. If Congress determines that more extensive
protection is warranted, then it is up to that body to enact appropriate
legislation. Such an extension is preferably made by politically accountable
representatives rather than unelectedjudges or administrators.
135 Federal whistleblower protection is also provided in the Occupational Health and
Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660 (2006); the Surface Transportation Assistance Act
of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006); the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of
1986, 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006); the International Safety Container Act of 1977, 46
U.S.C. § 1506 (2006); the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)
(2006); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2006); the Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 7001 (2006); the Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §
7622 (2006); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2006); the Energy Reorganization Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (2006); the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for
the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006); and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act
of 2002, 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2006). All of these whistleblower protection provisions
are under the enforcement authority of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.

